The alleged espionage involves “non-traditional collection,” a method in which the Chinese Ministry for State Security uses civilians unaffiliated with formal intelligence agencies to acquire sensitive data.
People walk by Hoover Tower on the Stanford University campus in Stanford, Calif., on March 12, 2019. (Justin Sullivan/Getty Images)

The Chinese Communist Party may be orchestrating a widespread intelligence-gathering campaign at Stanford University, with agents targeting students and researchers to extract sensitive information, a recent investigation by The Stanford Review alleges.
According to the report, the activity is focused on research areas such as artificial intelligence and robotics—critical fields under China's Made in China 2025 plan, which aims to position China as a dominant force in high-tech industries.

The alleged espionage involves “non-traditional collection,” a method in which the Chinese Ministry for State Security uses civilians unaffiliated with formal intelligence agencies to acquire sensitive data.

This data includes research conclusions, methodologies, software, lab workflows, and communication channels. Anonymous Stanford faculty members say that this collection is practiced extensively on campus, especially in AI and robotics.

The investigation highlighted the case of an individual named Charles Chen, an alleged CCP agent who impersonated a Stanford student to approach real students—predominantly women researching China-related topics—through social media.

His initial outreach about networking evolved into increasingly persistent and personal messages, including urging targets to use Chinese government-monitored platforms like WeChat and advising short trips to China to avoid visa scrutiny.

China’s 2017 national intelligence law requires all Chinese citizens to support state intelligence work, potentially leaving students with no option but to comply with CCP demands, the investigation highlights, assuming that some Chinese nationals at Stanford reportedly have handlers and relay information.
“The Chinese state incentivizes students to violate conflicts of commitment and interest, ensuring they bring back technology otherwise restricted by export controls,” former U.S. National Security Council Director for China Matthew Turpin said during a China Town Hall event.
Per the investigation, the China Scholarship Council (CSC), which funds a significant number of Chinese students abroad, may be seen as a primary vehicle for information gathering.

According to The Stanford Review, CSC recipients are required to submit “situation reports” on their research to Chinese diplomatic missions. These reports are used to identify sensitive technological information.

A report from Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology confirms that CSC agreements direct students to adhere to state-defined research objectives. A CSET issue brief notes that “the United States should adopt a measured approach to China’s scholarship incentives,” stating CSC scholarship agreements aim to persuade students to return to China or “serve the country.”

Students receiving CSC grants may be selected based on party loyalty and may be required to sign loyalty pledges, potentially impacting their families in China if they don't comply.

Turpin told The Stanford Review how Chinese authorities use threats to coerce information sharing.

“The Chinese government spends a lot of time collecting data on its overseas students; it has a pretty good understanding of who is doing what and if someone is working in an area of interest [frontier technology]. If students have access to things the government would like access to, it is relatively easy to reach out to an individual. They use carrots and sticks. If you turn over information, you may get a reward; if you don't, there is a punishment.”

The case of former Stanford researcher Chen Song serves as an example of the CCP directing individuals toward sensitive fields.

Song was indicted in 2020 for allegedly concealing her People’s Liberation Army affiliation on her visa application and providing updates on her Stanford research to a Chinese government entity. However, visa fraud charges against Song and two other Chinese researchers were later dropped in 2021. Prosecutors reportedly dropped the charges after evidence raised questions about the clarity of a visa application question regarding military service. Song’s attorney, John Hemann, told Courthouse News Service that he and his client were grateful the government “has done the right thing by dismissing this case.”

According to the investigation, espionage cases on campuses are rarely publicly disclosed and are often handled privately through visa cancellations. Accusations of racial profiling are seen as contributing to this silence and hindering investigations.

For example, the “China Initiative” program, created by the first Trump administration (and ended under President Biden) to raise awareness of Chinese espionage in academia, was criticized by “Stop AAPI Hate,” a coalition dedicated to fighting racism and discrimination against Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders. The group stated that the China Initiative “fueled bias and fostered hostility against Asian Americans and immigrants.”
Stanford history professor Gordon Chang, discussing concerns about Chinese influence in a 2019 Stanford Daily article, noted the potential for suspicion based on ethnicity. “We walk into a room of people, policy people—they look twice, if you’re Chinese,” Chang said. “Are you really American? Are you going to have America’s interest at heart?”
In testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China in 2017, visiting fellow Glenn Tiffert discussed China’s strategy of co-opting partners and nurturing dependencies in U.S. academia, stating, “Lenin once said that ‘capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them,’ and the Chinese Communist Party has taken this lesson to heart.”
A backgrounder from the Institute for Security & Development Policy notes that fears over Chinese expansion in strategic industries have led to strains with Western governments.
College Factual data indicates Stanford is popular among Chinese students, hosting approximately 1,129 in 2020. Moreover, the growth in Chinese enrollments has far outpaced students from other countries, at least in graduate studies. The Stanford Daily reported that from 2008 to 2019, Chinese graduate students rose from 485 to 995. Students from the next most popular country, India, dropped a bit from 368 to 326
Stanford has also received substantial foreign funding from China—over $64 million from anonymous donors from 2010 to 2021.
NTD News reached out to Stanford for comment. A university spokesperson provided the following statement:

“Stanford takes its commitment to national security with the utmost seriousness, and we are acutely aware of the threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party to all research universities. Stanford has rigorous policies and processes in place to ensure that research by its faculty and students is conducted in a manner that safeguards America’s interests.”

The statement noted that Stanford does not conduct classified or secret research.

“The university has a campus-wide process for reporting threats to research security and carefully assesses all reports,” the statement read. “We consult with federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies to ensure our policies and procedures are rigorous and protect national security.”

According to the statement, the university is reviewing the allegations detailed in the “Stanford Review” article and has contacted federal law enforcement for guidance on appropriate actions.

“It is also very important to distinguish between threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese and Chinese American faculty and students, who are at Stanford to learn and contribute to the generation of knowledge and are valued members of our community,” the statement said.